s Abstract Much of the literature about globalization exaggerates the degree of novelty. In this review, we concentrate on claims about what has changed about cities under late capitalism and globalization. Although we suggest that cities have long been influenced by global forces, we conclude that the roles of cities in the global system have changed considerably as a result of the time-space compression made possible by new transportation, communication, and organizational technologies. After discussing what the global perspective means within anthropology, and how it affects urban anthropological research, our review concentrates on three complex issues. First is whether the global factory and increasing knowledge-intensivity have decreased or increased the utility of the intermediary or brokerage roles that cities play. Second, we examine changes in how people live in globalizing cities. Third, we consider the implications of the construction and maintenance of relationships across borders for processes of citizenship, affiliation, and transnational social movements.
INTRODUCTION
A global perspective is not new in urban anthropology. A long line of anthropologists from Horace Miner (1953) to Aidan Southall (1998) have urged urban studies to pay attention to the full range of the urban experience, instead of concentrating on and generalizing from Western cities (Miner 1953 , Southall 1998 . Cities have always been key sites for transcultural connections such as long-distance trade and the transmission of innovations. Thus although globalization 1 has a much longer genealogy than credited in recent "global hype" (Wolf 1982 , Mintz 1998 , Sanjek 1999 , this continuity applies particularly to urban settings. The roles that cities play in the global system, however, have changed considerably, in part owing to
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SMART SMART time-space compression made possible by new transportation, communication, and organizational technologies.
In this review we consider "urbanization" to include not only the growth of cities, but the transformation of existing urban places. To adequately address the intersection between urbanization and global perspectives, we first provide a brief survey of the contested terrain of the globalization debate. Many authors tend to exaggerate the degree of novelty, and we argue for the need to attend to continuities with the past as well. Cities of the past had many of the features ascribed to "global cities," and early urban anthropologists also made important contributions to the understanding of the global system.
The remainder of our review concentrates on three issues about what has been alleged to have changed about cities under late capitalism (since the 1970s). First, we look at whether the extension of production around the world and increased salience of knowledge have decreased the utility of the intermediary roles that cities play. Second, we examine changes in how people live in globalizing cities, which have been seen as increasingly fragmented and unequal, characterized by social exclusion and an emerging digital divide. At the same time, people continue to resist these pressures and actively construct communities and places. Third, we consider the implications of the construction and maintenance of relationships across borders for the transformation of cities, focusing on translocality (Smith 2001) , citizenship in the context of transnational affiliation, and transnational social movements.
THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
Early cities emerged to facilitate trade or as centers of political and/or religious authority. All of these cities brought people of different cultures into close contact and fostered change, either in the form that Redfield & Singer (1954) called orthogenetic transformation (shifts from diverse local traditions toward orthodox Great Traditions) or heterogenetic transformation (fostering new modes of thought associated with the technical order or foreign control). As one example, Keyder (1999, pp. 3-4) insists that Istanbul has, since inception, been a world city: for most of its 1500 years "the largest permanent market place in the area between India and Western Europe" and a capital administering territories in three continents. Complex ethnoscapes and spaces of flows are not novelties in such cities (see also Abu-Lughod 1971) .
Dependency and world-system theorists insist that social scientists must go beyond the national level to examine the world as a whole. Accounts of societies that consider only their internal dynamics distort history (Frank 1998) . In Wallerstein's framework, cities such as Istanbul or Cairo were centers of world empires but became, at best, part of the semi-periphery in the era of the capitalist world economy. Imperialism is crucial because, as King (1989, p. 1) points out, most contemporary global cities were imperial metropoli, colonial capitals, or ports, so that contemporary urban hierarchies have "largely resulted from colonial rule."
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The proportion of the world's population that lives in cities has grown ever since the Industrial Revolution. About 3% of the world lived in urban places in 1800 , rising to 13% in 1900 , over 40% in 1980 (Brunn & Williams 1983 , and 47% in 2000, equaling about 2.9 billion people. More Developed Countries (MDCs) were 76% urbanized in 1999, compared to 39% for the Less Developed Countries (LDCs), but the rate of urbanization was much faster in the LDCs from 1950-2000, at 1.62% per year compared to 0.65% for the MDCs (United Nations Pop. Div. 1999). The global distribution of agricultural and medical technologies and world markets for agricultural commodities and inputs has transformed the ways of life even for those who remain in the countryside, challenging anthropological research methods.
Anthropology was among the last of the social sciences to study people in cities, but when those we worked with moved to cities, urban research was inevitable. It seems significant that pioneers of urban anthropology, particularly studies of the Copperbelt cities in Zambia, also broke new ground in the study of world systems. Godfrey Wilson (1941) argued that urban industry, labor migration, and rural villages had to be studied as parts of a single global socioeconomic system. Hunter (1936) , Gluckman (1963) , Mitchell (1969) , Mayer (1961) , and Epstein (1958) all addressed issues such as identity and translocal networks, which are still pertinent in addressing global restructuring and the destabilization of identity. Rapid urbanization in the Copperbelt attracted attention because it symbolized novelty and an "epochal leap in evolutionary time" toward industrial modernity (Ferguson 1999, p. 4) . Economic decline since the 1970s has resulted in deurbanization (Hansen 1997) . Modernity came to be seen as something in the past, an "object of nostalgic reverie, and 'backwardness' the anticipated (or dreaded) future" (Ferguson 1999, p. 13) . Social and cultural change during these periods of growth and decline can only be understood through attending to both global dynamics and local responses and interpretations.
The world actually became a less global place for most of the period between World War I and the 1970s, in terms of controls on movement of people, capital, and goods. Developed economies became more self-contained in response to the Depression, as did the South after World War II with decolonization and import substitution. States started to better fit the image of self-enclosed "containers of socio-economic and political-cultural relations" (Brenner 1999, p. 40) , in which cities served primarily national or sub-national roles. The crisis of Fordism (i.e., regimes of accumulation based on mass production, unionization, state-sponsored consumerism, and Keynesian fiscal management), owing to declining profits, encouraged offshore production, out-contracting of work, and restructuring of the welfare state (Nash 1989) . This combination has come to be referred to as globalization.
Many definitions of globalization assume too much.
We use an open-ended definition: the stretching and deepening of social relations across national borders so that everyday activities are more influenced by events at great distances. Most of this activity is not truly global but rather transnational (Hannerz 1992) or translocal
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SMART SMART (Smith 2001) . Even the largest corporations concentrate their activity in a few of the world's countries: Only firms with key brands or intellectual property rights, such as Coca-Cola or Microsoft, are everywhere. Some issues such as the threat of nuclear war, global warming, or depletion of the ozone layer can be said to be truly global, as can social movements focused on responding to them (Miller 2000) .
Transportation and communication technologies have certainly contributed to the "shrinking" of the world, but this is not new. Telegraphs and the world's stock markets produced global real time in the nineteenth century. Maintenance of transnational ties by migrants to New York was as significant in 1900 as in 2000 (Foner 2000) .
Supranational organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN); technologies such as container terminals, jets, the Internet, electronic funds transfer; and social movements such as human rights and environmentalism do allow people to more easily maintain ties across borders. However, exaggeration of their novelty and inevitability serve political agendas, legitimating changes by claiming that "there is no alternative" in a global world (Hirst & Thompson 1996 , Tsing 2000 .
We limit ourselves to three dimensions in the debate about globalization, the first of which is whether the world is becoming increasingly homogeneous. Some see global homogenization and the loss of cultural diversity, whether this is equated with Americanization or Westernization or the dominance of consumerism (Sklair 1991 , Klein 2000 . Others emphasize the proliferation of new hybrid or creolized cultural forms (García Canclini 1997 , Hannerz 1992 . The second facet of debates concerns whether globalization is driven from above or below. Many see it as the imposition of the hegemony of American/Western institutions such as WTO and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (McMichael 1998) . Others emphasize the agency of migrants, NGOs (Paley 2002), and virtual communities (Wilson & Peterson 2002) in building transnational linkages. The third area of debate concerns whether analysts see globalization as involving the erosion of national sovereignty (deterritorialization) or as preserving or even extending the power of (some) national states (Keating 2001) . It has been widely argued that globalization generates the greater salience of both sub-national and supra-national arenas for action at the expense of the nation-state, whereas the explosive growth of global finance constrains the freedom of action of national governments. Once primarily structured by their place within a nested national hierarchy, cities have become more influential in defining or defending roles for themselves within global arenas.
Anthropologists have been important contributors to the deterritorialization (Ong 1991 (Ong , 1999 , globalization from below (Mahler 1998 , Schein 1998 , and hybridity theses (Howes 1996 , Watson 1997 , Mathews 2000 , perhaps naturally, owing to our grounding in local research and processes. Phenomena such as transnationalism are more apparent from this perspective than from the statecentric data and categories of political science and economics (Smart 1999) .
For Appadurai (1996) , deterritorialization loosens connections between people, wealth, ideas, and territories (p. 49), resulting in a global "stage characterized 267 by radical disjunctures between different sorts of global flows and the uncertain landscapes created in and through these disjunctures" (p. 43). Increasing lack of connection between different flows produces "fluid, irregular shapes" that he characterizes as ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, and ideoscapes (p. 33). His extension of the idea of landscape is largely metaphorical, and little sense of changing streetscapes and spatial outcomes can be found in his work (Lin 2003) .
Brenner (1999, p. 62) argues that deterritorialization analysts see the relation between global space and territoriality as a zero-sum game and fail to capture the ways in which "territoriality is being reconfigured and re-scaled rather than eroded." Deterritorialization through free trade pacts or global telecommunications presupposes the "fixed socioterritorial infrastructures within, upon, and through which global flows can circulate" (p. 62). Cities acquire new capabilities through engaging with transnational networks. A locality is not a bounded region so much as a "contingent and ever-shifting mesh of interactive processes" (Olds & Yeung 1999, p. 535 ). We do not live in the borderless world diagnosed by Ohmae (1990) ; borders are still formidable restrictions for the nonelite (Heyman 1995 , Cunningham 1999 , De Genova 2002 , and governments still have a great deal of influence on what is done and how. Still, as Appadurai (1996) persuasively argues, the imagination combines with new media technology to allow us to affiliate in ways that bring us closer to someone around the globe than to our next-door neighbor. Making sense of opposed tendencies toward deterritorialization and expanded state capacities requires rejecting globalization as a singular process and recognizing the diversity of its projects and outcomes (Yang 2000) , described by Rees & Smart (2001) as "plural globalities." Doing so creates major challenges, but also opportunities, for anthropological research strategies.
Urbanization of peoples traditionally studied by anthropology, combined with growing legitimacy for "anthropology at home," resulted in rapid growth of urban anthropology from the 1970s. The Society for Urban Anthropology section of the AAA had 347 members in 1997 when it changed its name and mandate to the Society for Urban, National, and Transnational/Global Anthropology, and membership increased to 712 in 2002 (N. Foner and O. Lynch, personal communication) . Urban anthropology has made important contributions to our understanding of migration (Foster & Kemper 2002) , housing (Pellow 1999) , social and spatial organization (Low & Lawrence-Zuniga 2003) , informal economies, and other topics (Smith 2000) . However, anthropologists are still poorly represented in the main venues of interdisciplinary urban studies. In a convenience sample of 17 interdisciplinary edited volumes related to this review's topics, the modal number of chapters contributed by anthropologists was zero, accounting for 5.3% of the chapters. We could identify only two articles written by anthropologists out of 173 (1.1%) in the 2002 volumes of three main urban studies journals: Urban Studies, Urban Affairs Review, and International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. Urban anthropology needs to engage itself more with the broader field of urban studies, both to communicate its contributions, but also to find new ways to research transformed urban contexts.
Urban anthropology has tended to assume a rural/urban dichotomy (or sometimes a continuum). Differences between them have become less clear and continue to shrink as a result of new technologies. To a great extent, in developed countries, urban ways of life have become available almost anywhere (Zenner 2002 ). Global connectivity makes it possible for call centers in Ireland or India to deal with consumer inquiries from Oklahoma (Breathnach 2000) or back-office accounting functions or programming to be done halfway around the globe. Blurring of the urban and rural is particularly pronounced in sprawling urban fields that have emerged in areas like South China (Zhou & Zhang 1995) or Los Angeles. In these areas, the idea of the self-governing urban community has almost completely disappeared. Spatial fragmentation is matched by the growth of "edge cities" in the suburbs and exurbia: clusters of office towers, shopping malls, and other facilities that reproduce some of the main functions that used to be concentrated downtown. Researching fragmented urban fields raises some of the same questions as does the study of globalization: complexity and diversity. In the next section, we examine the issue of the economic role of cities in an era where the shift to a knowledge economy combines with global connectivity to suggest their declining utility.
ECONOMIC NICHES AND URBAN COMPETITION
The rapid growth of cities after 1800 was possible because, with industrialization, cities became centers of production. Economies of scale in manufacturing produced vast agglomerations with all the disorder and human misery described so well by Engels and Dickens. Transportation and other facilities increased the attraction of cities for new industries, and growing populations created demand for services.
Some commentators diagnose trends that reverse this process, potentially resulting in the decline of cities as the main centers of economic activity. These trends include: the shift from material products toward digital or virtual products (Lash & Urry 1994 , Thrift & Amin 2002 ; teleworking, outsourcing, and the separation of back-offices from managerial functions (Graham & Marvin 1996) ; post-materialist values and environmentalism; fear of and flight from the city (Low 2003) . The electronic requiem for the city suggests that telecommunications "displace the need for physical movement between home and work, while urban functions will no longer have a physical presence as services are delivered in electronic form" (Graham & Marvin 1996, p. 243) .
If economic activity can be coordinated through phone, fax, or cyberspace, then it becomes less necessary for firms and employees to concentrate in cities, since many costs are higher in large cities (Plotnicov 1991) . Whereas economies of scale associated with mass production encouraged large production facilities and agglomeration of suppliers and clients, information technology more readily facilitates the disaggregation of production, networked cooperation, economies of scope, and the "global assembly line." The outcomes of such changes, however, are not determined by technology but through its interaction with the agendas of powerful actors and the structures of the capitalist economy (Blim 2000 , Hakken 2003 ).
Much debate on urban futures focuses on forces countervailing against decentralization: the continued local embeddedness of business, even in finance, the most global of industries (Thrift 1994) ; the cultural attractions of large cities for knowledge workers and other elites (Florida 2002) ; the localization of knowledge and expertise (Hsu & Saxenian 2000) ; and limitations on the outsourcing and decentralization of work and commerce, as increasing velocities of product cycles may make even airfreight seem too slow or quality assurance too difficult . Urban regions continue to be the most effective platforms on which to construct competitive economies.
Still, it does seem clear that developments in recent decades have increased uncertainties for cities, frequently undermining core industries (Nash 1989) . One result is the rise of what has been called urban entrepreneurialism, where cities compete for economic growth, and reconstruct growth machines to enhance their competitive edge and defend old niches from global challenges or craft new opportunities from globalized markets. In some ways little more than an updating of old-fashioned boosterism or place-marketing (Rutheiser 1996) , inter-urban competition does seem to have increased, enhancing the importance of turning place-in-itself into place-for-itself, particularly for middle-ranking cities with an opportunity to improve their salience for outside investors. At the same time, urban sprawl and fragmented governance make regional cooperation correspondingly more challenging .
Outcomes vary considerably so that growth prospects for some cities may be excellent even if the trends are negative for urban places in general. The winners most often nominated are the world cities, global cities, or global command and control centers, which serve to integrate and coordinate the globalized economy (Friedmann 1986 , Sassen 1991 , King 1991 , Abu-Lughod 1999 , Yusuf & Wu 2002 . While stimulating a great deal of attention, the influence of this approach has also generated academic boosterism ("my city is a global city too") and neglect of more widely distributed processes of transnational urbanism (Smith 2001, p. 71) . Although rankings attract interest, there is a danger of misplaced concreteness in such exercises (Beaverstock et al. 2000 , Taylor & Walker 2001 , Godfrey & Zhou 1999 . Tyner (2000) suggests that the approach involves a priori exclusion of Third World cities, even though cities such as Manila and Dhaka are key control sites for the export of global labor. Others have suggested that the evidence for the claims of global city theorists is rather weak (Samers 2002) or ignores differences between Tokyo, the capital of a developmentalist state, and New York/London, centers of leading neoliberal states (Hill & Kim 2000) .
Some commentators are not convinced that the increased mobility of manufacturing and routine service work and scope for economic coordination at a distance necessarily advantages global cities such as New York or London. Some smaller cities have managed to wire themselves more effectively and have become as central to Internet data flows as the world cities (Townsend 2001 , Zook 2001 . Other smaller cities can also be intensely global (e.g., Geneva for international organizations, Zurich for finance, Bermuda for offshore corporations). Thus, we need to attend to globalized cities rather than simply a small set of cities where corporate headquarters are concentrated (Susser & Schneider 2003) . Although centralization has so far accompanied other forms of decentralization facilitated by time-space compression, the reduced friction of distance means that centralization need not necessarily follow past patterns.
Even if urban growth increasingly is detached from a city's immediate hinterland and is reliant on competitiveness in transnational arenas, the paths to vitality are not fixed. Smaller cities and rural areas may capitalize on their lower costs and environmental amenities to attract companies and professionals whose work is telemediated and can be carried anywhere. However, the more that entrepreneurial cities compete for the same roles and markets, the less net benefit there may be, at least in zero-sum-type competitions, where rent-seeking may dissipate anticipated gains (Smart 1998) . Competition for corporate headquarters or mega-events such as the Olympics are examples (Kipfer & Keil 2002 , Olds 2001 . Whereas the common emphasis in development plans on tourism (e.g., Kuppinger 1998 , Crain 1996 may seem similar, Clark (2000, p. 16) found that the promotion of amenities for citizens has been among the most effective strategies in recent decades. Hannigan (1998) argues that the rich countries are undergoing a shift from service economies to what he calls the experience economy, in which new forms of consumption are increasingly driving economic growth. These developments have been seen as the proliferation of homogeneous American fashions and the promotion of the cultural interests of the professional classes. However, Crewe & Beaverstock (1998) argue that such criticisms overgeneralize specific social and spatial outcomes and neglect other examples where vibrant consumer landscapes have been created. Friedmann (2001) stresses that mobilizing human, social, natural, and environmental resources of an urban region may not be sustainable if those resources thereby become depleted. Mining assets such as social capital may increase prosperity for a while, but they need to be invested in to continue to underpin growth. Knowledge of how to nurture the social and cultural conditions for cohesion and prosperity in an era of intensifying globalization is still in its infancy.
What of cities in the LDCs? World-system theorists see cities in the periphery and semi-periphery as either mediators of the exploitation of their hinterland or as bases for labor-intensive exports, resulting in overurbanization/underindustrialization and reliance on informal economies (Song & Timberlake 1996) . New International Division of Labor theorists focused on the transfer of manufacturing while profits become concentrated in core corporations (Blim 1992) . By contrast, Kearney (1995, p. 554 ) stresses the process of global implosion where the distinction between core and periphery becomes obviated through peripheralization of parts of the core (Halperin 1999) and through the emergence of high-tech sectors in portions of the Third World. At one extreme, former LDC cities have grown rich (Hong Kong, Singapore) and others (Bangalore, Seoul, Taipei, Shanghai) have become centers for computer hardware and software (Hsu & Saxenian 2000) or offshore banking centers (Amit 1997), whereas other LDC cities are at risk of 271 becoming what Castells (1998, p. 162) calls "black holes of informational capitalism": too insignificant in new knowledge economies to even be worth exploiting and potential sources of risk through refugees and instability. Greater diversity, rather than core/periphery dualism, becomes apparent around the world and within cities.
Traditional economic practices in LDC cities, as elsewhere, have come under challenge as they are pried open to competition by structural adjustment policies and WTO rules (McMichael 1998 , Applbaum 1998 . Bazaar economies are challenged by malls [raising fears of shoppinizacion in Buenos Aires (Guano 2002) ], McDonald's, and Walmarts (Classen 1996 , Dannhaeuser 1996 , Watson 1997 , garment industries are overwhelmed by the import of used clothes from the West (Hansen 2000), and foreign cultural products displace local ones (Mathews & Lui 2001 , Effird 2001 . Although informal and illegal economies still pervade most LDC cities (Fernandes & Varley 1998) , the informalization that has been identified as a trend in the rich cities (Mingione 1991, Portes et al. 1989 , Sassen 1991 , Halperin 1999 ) is matched by pressures toward formalization in the Third World, for example through the medium of political pressure on trade-related intellectual property rights and the removal of restrictions on foreign retailers (Carrier 1998 , Babb 1999 . Dick & Rimmer (1998) describe convergence between Southeast Asian and American cities, particularly in the blurring of the urban/rural dichotomy, rapid economic growth in the urban peripheries, and increased numbers of gated communities.
Increased inter-urban competition and diverging trajectories for the economic prospects of residents raise crucial issues for urban governance and citizenship. Is redistribution economically counterproductive in an era of urban entrepreneurialism (Gregory 1998 , Rosenberger 1999 , Jessop 2002 ? How are development coalitions constituted and maintained (Logan et al. 1997) ? What are the implications of increasing inequality and disenfranchisement for the civility of urban society (Holston 1999)? Are increasingly authoritarian forms of social control required when large populations become undesired by changing local labor markets (Body-Gendrot 2000, Caldeira 1999)? How is welfare restructuring related to competitiveness rhetoric and policy (Jessop 1993 , Keating 2001 )? Most fundamentally, is the city even the appropriate locus for considering such issues, as cyberspace makes it possible for residents to act simultaneously in more than one place (Thrift & Amin 2002) ?
LIVING IN GLOBALIZING CITIES
Globalization and time-space compression have made it more feasible than ever before to break the link between locale, where one lives, and milieu, the environment that is practically relevant to an individual (Durrschmidt 1997) . Although transnational involvement by ordinary people is not a new thing, technology makes it much easier to act simultaneously in different places so that anonymous neighbors may be intensely involved in communities that include people from around the globe. What does the possibility of "localities without community and cultures without locality" (Albrow 1997, p. 42) mean for daily life and the social and cultural organization of cities? How do the implications vary by class, occupation, gender, and lifestyle grouping?
Increased connectivity is conjoined with growing divisions. The global city literature suggests that world cities magnify more universal trends toward increased social polarization related to neoliberal global projects, economic restructuring, and welfare reform. Ideas about the increasing salience of knowledge in the economy, or informational capitalism, also raise the prospect of an increasing digital divide between knowledge workers and manual workers or the underclass within cities, or divisions between "fast" and "slow" societies on the global scale. Polarization and divisions have also been alleged to encourage the decline of common civic culture and shared public places and lead to the "fortress city" to protect the haves from the have-nots (Guano 2002 , Caldeira 1999 , Low 2003 . Migration from nontraditional sources may also increase divisions along ethnic lines (Amin 2002), even as it contributes to urban vitality and economic dynamism.
Within these divided and unstable places (Greenhouse 2002) , people struggle to create or defend meaningful collective activities and spaces. For example, DarianSmith (2002) describes the resurrection of old practices of "beating the village bounds" in southern England, despite the fact that most of the participants are middle-class newcomers who commute to jobs in London. Vincent & Warf (2002, p. 30 ) document the recent growth of eruvim, religious Jewish enclaves, in North America and Europe and interpret it as part of a "global surge in ethnic identity that has emerged as a backlash to postmodern capitalism." Srinivas (2001) argues that the Karaga ritual procession in Bangalore enacts earlier landscapes obliterated by urban planning and uncontrolled settlements. The landscape of urban memory is not a personal or cognitive process alone but is achieved by movement through space that renews linkages between different parts of the urban field. In all these cases, actions claim or maintain boundaries around a space and assert commonalities that are continually challenged by broader processes. This process happens at all levels of urban space: block parties, neighborhood watch, and regional planning initiatives. Everywhere, people also organize to protest and resist developments that they believe negatively impact their communities (McDonogh 1999 , Parnell 2002 , Rotenberg 1999 .
There is still no consensus about whether or not inequality is increasing on a global scale. Debates abound concerning the units of analysis and measurement, conflicting results at different geographic scales and timescales, the definition of poverty, whether focus should be on income, income after tax and transfers or wealth, and so on (Fan 1995 , Smart 2002 . Some argue that unregulated global restructuring is resulting in "labor market dualism, polarized urban social structures, and declining living standards" (Levine 1995, p. 90) . Certainly in some contexts inequality has grown considerably: the global cities generally (Logan et al. 1992, p. 131) , the United States as a whole (Fainstein 1995, p. 126) , and Hong Kong. A major factor has been the decline of industry and a shift to patterns that reduce opportunities for those without high educational qualifications. These trends have been seen as producing an underclass that is socially excluded from the labor market and the resources necessary to promote social mobility. At the same time, discourses of fiscal austerity imposed on local and national governments by globalization have encouraged restructuring of welfare state institutions, particularly in the direction of privatization and workfare (Kingfisher & Goldsmith 2001 , Schneider 2001 , Clark 2000 . The consequences have been documented in ethnographic studies of foodbanks and soup kitchens (Glasser 1988 , Curtis 1997 , Caldwell 2002 , homelessness (Glasser & Bridgman 1999) , downward social mobility (Newman 2001), and domestic violence (Susser 1996) . In the poorer cities, structural adjustment programs and government deficits have often decimated the ranks of government employees, often the core of the middle class. However, in some cases, restructuring has increased the availability of industrial jobs so that the outcomes are even more diverse than in the MDC cities.
Elsewhere in this volume, Morgen & Maskovsky review studies of urban poverty and welfare reform in the more developed countries, so we concentrate here on complementary studies of middle-class and elite communities. What happens to the middle class and the elite is of course related to what happens to the poor, the clearest expressions of which are the phenomena of gentrification (Smith 1996 (Smith , 2002 Caulfield 1994 , Ley 1996 and the rapid growth of gated communities and other expressions of the "city of fear" (Low 2003) . Middle-class flight to "safer" and lower-tax suburbs created funding crises for inner cities with their higher social service and infrastructure costs (Gregory 1998, p. 65) , but the return of some of them in the form of gentrification is also causing problems through displacement of the urban poor.
The middle class does not always want to live in areas where similar kinds of people predominate. In the Brixton area of London, Robson & Butler (2001, p. 76) found that 63% of middle-class people surveyed mentioned the area's social mix as a positive feature, compared to 4% who mentioned the positive feature of the presence of "like-minded people." In nearby Telegraph Hill, however, a stronger emphasis on solidifying middle-class networks and associations was related to a sense of the area as a middle-class haven where London's "diversity and delights can be enjoyed from a secure and largely self-contained base" (p. 80). Gregory's (1998) study of a black community in New York emphasizes the political processes by which activists and residents struggled to overcome divisions between the middle class and the poor by emphasizing their common vulnerability to broader structures of racial exclusion.
Many interventions in cities have been seen as efforts to make them more hospitable to the professional middle-class as well as international investors and tourists, usually at the expense of the poor and minorities (Smith 1996 (Smith , 2002 Cooper 1999; Zukin 1991) . Urban revitalization is seen as relying on the reconstitution of a sufficient stock of safety and, if possible, civility. Inter-urban competition demands that major cities be made safe, and attractive, for the transnational elite, as well as their middle-class subordinates. Social polarization increases fear of violence, requiring "pacification." Increasing violence and social tension has generated similar tendencies in many LDC cities as well (Caldeira 1999). Body-Gendrot (2000) demonstrates that pacification is accomplished in different ways in the United States, where escalation of repressive policing and zerotolerance policies have been dominant, and in France, where crime prevention through social inclusion is given more emphasis.
Repression is seen as having its limits, not to mention high costs. In reaction, the idea of social capital has had increasing impact on urban policies. Putnam (2000) blames urban problems on the decline of community involvement and argues that recuperating neighborhoods require civically engaged communities. The policy challenge for such analysts is to find ways to rebuild stocks of local social capital (relationships, trust, and membership in voluntary organizations) rather than relying only on disciplinary force to maintain order. Forrest & Kearns (2001, p. 2141) see such approaches as another version of "deficit theory syndrome": identifying something lacking in individuals or communities as a key cause of social problems, rather than looking at broader societal forces. De Soto (2000) takes a different approach in arguing that it is the incompleteness of property rights in poor cities that keeps them poor.
Woolcock (1998) argues that it is possible to have too much social capital, particularly when it is concentrated in communities in such a way as to limit extralocal linkages. What provides the best developmental contexts, he suggests, are community level forms of integration that encourage and foster outside linkages as well as local social cohesion. Ethnic enclaves and established working-class communities may have intense local connectivity, but without the external linkages needed to thrive in a globally competitive "knowledge economy." O'Byrne (1997, p. 76) argues that "awareness of the globe as a perceivable whole" is differentially distributed and that working-class communities may develop a localism that reduces understanding of the challenges and opportunities that globalization poses. As one of his informants stated: "Whatever happens . . . it doesn't affect me. I've got my life and my family to look after. They come first. Nothing that happens out there is going to change that, or help me" (p. 81).
Though hardly a universal characteristic of tightly knit working-class communities, such sentiments do vividly illustrate what has been referred to as the digital divide (Crow & Longford 2000) . Graham (2002, p. 34) notes that whereas 2%-5% of the world's population has become superconnected, with access to rich sources of information and contacts at all times, at least 60% of the globe's people have never even made a phone call. While the Internet and telecommunications do have liberatory potential for transcending traditional social and geographical barriers, the trajectories of these industries have not concentrated on this. Instead, promotion of global connectedness has often been combined with increased costs of basic phone service, cutting off an increasing number of the urban poor in the MDC cities (Graham 2002) . Global connectivity can be associated with growing disconnection at the local scale. However, Hampton & Wellman (1999) found in their study of the "first interactive new home community" in a Toronto suburb that residents spent much of their online activity interacting with people who lived or worked near each other.
Despite the tendency of technology innovation to extend the power of the powerful and reinforce existing uneven development (Graham 2002, p. 36) , at least some remedial efforts are being made. James (2002) describes technological innovations that emphasize reducing costs rather than expanding capabilities. For example, new forms of wireless telephony have reduced cost per connection in remote villages by seven times. Low-cost email can be provided by "store and forward" delivery through satellites. And recycling obsolete computers has the potential to expand in the same way that the global used clothes trade has (Hansen 2000) .
Superconnectedness only highlights a more general phenomenon: Living in a globalizing city may involve little interaction with those living nearby. The products of popular culture and the mass media may be much more central to daily routines, dreams, and aspirations. Bodies may inevitably be located in particular places, but imaginations and loyalties need not be, and Appadurai (1996) is right in insisting that the localist prejudices of ethnographic tradition need to be overcome to deal with the contemporary world, particularly as experienced by the middle classes.
In LDC cities, modernity and its trappings have been a consistent vehicle for dreams (Ferzacca 2001 , Rofel 1999 . The pursuit of modernity generates changes both in the planning and governance of cities (McDonogh 1999 , Guano 2002 and in the behavior of their residents. One response is to try to move to the cities of the rich world, partly for pragmatic reasons, but often also in part to partake of true modernity, to be where the action is, whether this is Paris or Silicon Valley. As significant as transnational migration is in globalization, we cannot understand it without seeing it in the continuing centrality of governmental projects (Ong & Nonini 1997) , as well as in relation to the possibility of becoming "transnational" while staying at home. Participation in transnational social movements is a particularly crucial dimension of the adoption of a global worldview. The nature of citizenship is affected by eased affiliation with distant individuals, groups, or causes.
TRANSLOCALITY, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Globalization involves a vast spider's web of interacting projects. Some of these projects encourage mobility, whereas others try to maintain or impose enclosures, whether of people, goods, capital, or ideas. Some projects inspire resistance to official projects, and everywhere some people manage to get around the rules (Greenhouse 2002 , Heyman 1999a . Although the mobility of goods and capital has been greatly enhanced, restrictions on the movement of people have been maintained or reinforced. When promoting migration, rich countries increasingly recruit for skilled and educated migrants. Many who do not qualify have responded by migrating illegally.
Migration, legal or illegal, has a tremendous impact on the demography and landscape of cities because the vast majority of international migrants settle in the largest cities. In Canada, which, after Australia, has the highest percentage of foreign-born population, 71.2% of immigrants settled in Toronto, Vancouver, or Montréal. Nearly half of Toronto's citizens were born outside Canada. The extent of residential segregation and retention of distinct consumption preferences varies considerably between countries and even cities and profoundly influences the texture and vitality of urban spaces (Bauder & Sharpe 2002) . The vibrant spaces of diverse cities can serve as powerful magnets for the highly skilled workers and investors attracted to the quality of urban life (Florida 2002), but they can also result in perceptions of urban danger that prompt flight from the central cities. How cities manage diversity seems to be a critical factor in their competitive success.
Glick Schiller et al. (1992, p . 1) defined transnationalism as "the processes by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement." Smith (2001) argues that these fields are better seen as translocal than transnational (linking Oaxaca and San Diego, for example, more than Mexico and the United States). He sees contemporary cities as being profoundly changed by the "rise of translocalities" (places separated by national borders but united through social and cultural affiliation with groups, categories, networks, and amenities) so that the politics of transforming and defending place have to be seen as resulting from the intersection of bounded jurisdictions with translocal networks and coalitions. Numerous commentators suggest that the first wave of research failed to recognize the high degree of continuity with the past (Portes et al. 1999 , Kistivo 2001 , Vertovec 1999 . Foner (2000, p. 184) 
notes:
If many academic observers who studied earlier immigrants were guilty of overlooking transnational ties in the quest to document assimilation, there is now a risk of overemphasizing the centrality of transnationalism and minimizing the extent to which contemporary immigrants "become American."
Migrants to New York City in 1900 and 2000 were alike in regular returns, sending remittances, being involved in home community politics and news, and investing in houses and land back home. What has changed is that it has become easier to maintain high levels of contact, there is greater tolerance for cultural diversity, the importance of international business has increased the utility of knowledge of foreign lands and languages, and immigration policies have discriminated in favor of professionals who can afford to maintain closer contacts (Foner 2000) . Is transnationalism a one-generation phenomenon? Foner (2000, p. 238) suggests that some of these trends may make it likelier for the second generation to maintain ties than in the past. Louie (2001) is more doubtful about this.
Recent scholarship has illuminated a variety of dimensions of transnationalism: its promotion or suppression as part of state projects (Glick Schiller 1999 , Smith 2001 Lang & Smart 2002 ). All of these processes have an impact on the texture and quality of urban landscapes, although these dimensions have often not received as much attention as they deserve (Ma 2003) . Shifting the focus from transnationalism, with its implied focus on identity, toward translocality may help turn attention toward the broader implications for rapidly changing urban places.
The involvement of migrants in political and other activities in both the place of residence and place of origin inevitably raises issues of citizenship. Policies of national governments on issues such as dual citizenship, remittances, nonresident voting, pensions, and so on have a major impact on whether and how transnational communities form (Al-Ali et al. 2001 , Glick Schiller 1999 .
It is not only national governments that influence migrants' access to rights of citizenship. Sometimes, as in China, local governments can limit the access of domestic migrants to crucial resources (Solinger 1999 , Smart & Smart 2001 . Zhang (2001) has provided a vivid account of how such restrictions affect the daily lives of migrants in Beijing. Migrants have responded by constructing their own unofficial spaces in the domains of housing, education, labor markets, and the maintenance of order. These unofficial translocal spaces have often been subjected to repression owing to fear by local governments that the "political vacuums" developing in these places might "become fertile ground for the growth of social vices and nonstate political forces" (p. 2). Denying migrants rights to the city can create serious problems for authorities intent on disciplining space.
Transnational migrants have also become involved in the construction of new political spaces that cross conventional boundaries between nations and ethnic groups (Anderson 2001). However, research on transnational social movements demonstrates that it is not only migrants who help to constitute transnational social fields: Being an activist in Amnesty International, peace movements (Miller 2000) , transnational labor advocacy networks (Trubek et al. 2000) , or indigenous rights movements (Mato 2000 , Vargas Cetina 2001 often involves acting at a distance without leaving home. The so-called anti-globalization movement is a particularly interesting example of the kinds of transnational linkages and cooperation that can be accomplished while explicitly eschewing any kind of formal organization. Graeber (2002, pp. 64-65) argues that the movement is not actually against globalization per se but against the kind of globalization that is "limited to the movement of capital and commodities, and actually increases barriers against the free flow of people, information and ideas." These movements all reflect human struggles to transform global milieux into something closer to the human scale of the locales that for most of human existence have been the dominant focus of activity and concern.
CONCLUSION
Most anthropologists maintain a commitment to the twin methodological precepts of holism and ethnographic rigor. Although not necessarily in conflict, the demands of these principles produce a profound sense of inadequacy when approaching research on a large city or global process. Inability to deal with all of the interacting forces and their complex outcomes while recognizing the partiality of any artificial delimitation of the subject matter (Devons & Gluckman 1964) creates questions about what anthropology can contribute to such areas. Such limitations apply to this review even more intensely. We have delimited our coverage by concentrating on claims about what has changed about cities under late capitalism and globalization. Our conclusions have been skeptical: Many claims of novelty suffer from a lack of historical perspective. Globalization was a powerful force centuries before being given that label, and, although time-space compression makes acting at a transnational scale easier, many people still maintained close ties across borders a century ago. Still, conditions have changed enough that the distinctions between urban and non-urban are much fuzzier than they were a century ago. Is there anything that can justly be described as urbanism when many of its features have become available in what once were radically isolated places, for example for Inuit artists in the Canadian Arctic? Does the urban disappear when it becomes available 24/7 anywhere on the globe? At the same time, concentrating large numbers of people in relatively close proximity continues to lead to very different landscapes and structures of feeling, opportunity, and risk. Even if the intermediary roles of cities do become less significant for economic processes, they may still retain their magnetism for those who desire experiences that are only available in cities such as live theater or busy streets. However, these attractions will only overcome the costs if a minimum level of livability and safety can be preserved, far from a certain situation if social polarization and urban fortresses become the norm.
We concentrated on three questions: How have the economic roles of cities changed as a result of time-space compression and the greater importance of knowledge in economic activity? How do people live in cities that are becoming more connected to and more dependent on global arenas and forces? How does the maintenance of close social ties across national boundaries influence urban landscapes, citizenship, identity, and affiliation? None of these questions has been answered here, but our survey should clearly indicate that anthropologists do have a great deal to offer in understanding such processes. It is the tension between "experience-near" research and recognition of the interconnections between different domains of urban life that gives a different flavor to the contributions of anthropologists to the broader field of urban studies.
